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If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes 
some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I 
provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities 
interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the group of loyal and non-loyal citizens 
or investors is endogenous. Further I consider the implications of tax harmonization and 
minimum taxes for these types of non-price competition. Home attachment reduces the 
intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests 
much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can 
intensify countries’ investment in home attachment. 
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Public ﬁnance has analyzed competition for direct investment, ﬁnancial cap-
ital and human capital1 with a focus on tax rates as the instrument of com-
petition. There are notable exceptions, but the general validity of the claim
becomes evident if one recalls the Wildasin (1988) or the Zodrow-Mieskowski
(1986) frameworks of tax competition that have become the workhorses for
analysing tax competition.2 In this respect, much of this analysis is struc-
turally similar to what would be considered as Bertrand or price competition
in the context of the competition between ﬁrms. Other types of ’price’ compe-
tition for capital have also been explored: standard auctions (Black and Hoyd
1989, Besley and Seabright 1999), monopolistic competition (Kind, Knarvik
and Schjelderup 2000), Hotelling location competition (Hohaus, Konrad and
Thum 1994, Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele 2002, 2005). Prices govern
the allocation of resources also in these approaches.
Countries can use other means of competition by which they can try and
acquire a larger share of the tax base, and some of these competition modes
make the tax base a common pool resource.3 Id e ﬁne a common pool resource
here as a resource that is rival in its use, for which property rights are not
(yet) well deﬁned, with players rivalling regarding the allocation of property
rights. Tax rates or investment subsidies are clearly important determinants
as variables that govern the allocation of the internationally mobile tax base.
But the extent to which a country can impose taxes on a given tax base
without making it move away is governed by activities which are structurally
1Foreign direct investment and ﬁnancial capital are the more prominent targets in tax
competition. However, competition for human capital has a long tradition. Bhagwati and
Dellalfar (1973), Bhagwati (1976) and Raymond (1973) were among the ﬁrst to discuss
the downsides of this competition.
2Any list of seminal contributions to this capital tax competition literature will noto-
riously be unfair to some authors, but should include Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986),
Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1988), Gordon (1986, 1992) and Sinn (1990). I gladly leave
a possible blame of omissions to the excellent surveys by Wilson (1999), Wildasin and
Wilson (2004), Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005) and Sørensen (2007).
3Tax base as a common pool resource has been considered in the context of vertical
tax externalities, where a tax base in one location is subject to taxation by multiple,
vertically ordered and independently acting ﬁscal authorities, as in Keen (1998), Keen
and Kotsogiannis (2002) and Wrede (1997, 2000). Wrede (1999) explicitly uses the term
"ﬁscal common" in this context.
2similar to appropriation eﬀort or eﬀort in establishing property claims.4 Ma-
jor categories of such appropriation eﬀorts are advertising, branding,a n dt h e
investment in tax payer loyalty.
Countries widely advertise, trying to attract foreign direct investors. This
advertising is partially informative. Informative advertising was used in Aus-
tria’s campaign in 2005. The full-page advertisement simply displayed a
comparison between the corporate tax rates of 25 percent in Austria and 38
percent in Germany. The advertisement also emphasized that Austria and
Germany are very similar along other dimensions that are relevant determi-
nants for investment decisions, including access to the German market.5
This type of advertisement weakens the loyalty of citizens or investors in
other countries, by informing them about other alternatives. Other types of
advertising may aim at building up a particular image, making the country
diﬀerent from other countries in the eyes of the investors or tax payers. An
4Activities that generate or change the loyalty of tax payers are the equivalent in the
tax-competition context to activities that deﬁne or re-deﬁne property rights in natural
resource common pool problems. Sinn (1984), e.g., addressed this problem formally, in
the context of oil extraction from a common pool and considered the option to separate
the resource from the common pool.
5See The Economist, 2005, 3-5/05.
3example for this type of advertising is a recent campaign6 by the Interna-
tional Marketing Council (IMC) of South Africa by which a public-private
partnership tries to give the country the image described on their homepage:
„South Africa, a country at the southern tip of Africa, inspires the world to a
new way of doing things, because our unique combinations create refreshing
possibilities”.
Finally, Germany launched a major advertising campaign for attracting
foreign direct investment in 2006, labelled Germany, Land of Ideas.A sp a r t
of this campaign, German fashion top model Claudia Schiﬀer volunteered
to pose. Pictures of her have been displayed prominently on advertising
boards in the subway stations of London and New York. On these pictures
she is partially wrapped in a German ﬂag and the headline says: "Invest in
Germany, boys".7
The idea that "persuasive" advertising is a common pool problem where
ﬁrms expend eﬀort for attracting a larger share in a given pool of customers
is very old. It is the basic underlying hypothesis for much of the formal game
theory on advertising in the business literature and can be traced back at
least to Friedman (1958) or Schmalensee (1976). Countries play these games
as well.8
6See, e.g., The Economist, October 21, 2006.
7http://www.land-der-ideen.de/CDA/presse_medien,33,0„de.html
8Similarly, when politicians travel, they advertize national ﬁrms and their products,
but also promote their countries for attracting investors. While such activities are diﬃcult
to measure, Rose (2007), for instance, documents that the foreign service heavily engages
in trade policy.
4Much like ﬁrms, countries also invest in their brand names. The Anholt
Nation Brands Index, for instance, publicizes the brand values of 30 major
nations on a quarterly basis. According to this index, in 2006 the brand
value of the United States of America was more than 17 trillion US-Dollar.
The value of Germany as a brand was lower, but still 100 times the market
value of Coca-Cola. The factors that inﬂuence the brand value are partially
known. A nation’s relative success along many dimensions, including eco-
nomics, science or sports matters. Also, public attention gained from host-
ing major events such as the Olympics or the World Soccer Championships
matter. Expenditure by which politicians try to persuade the members of
the IOC, or expenditure that promote national sports programmes can be
seen as marketing expenditure or investment in the nation brand.
Similar to ﬁrms, countries also try to build up what would be called a
"base of loyal customers" in business language. Countries may try to make
citizens, tax payers or the tax base immobile. Along this dimension, coun-
tries may have even more powerful instruments than ﬁrms. Social security
systems and the payment structure for civil servants are, for instance, ways
to generate a lock-in for some share of the population. Countries also choose
or strongly inﬂuence the content of primary and secondary education. They
can and do use this to instill patriotism as a particular type of emotional
home attachment. Many examples for this type of policy can be given. The
prototype of education policy could be observed in Nazi-Germany which very
a c t i v e l yp u r s u e da ne d u c a t i o np o l i c yw i t hr a t h e re x t r e m eg o a l s .T h i se x a m -
ple also shows that this is a very powerful instrument, and one that is rather
unappealing. But more moderate versions of loyalty building education with
a clear shift in intentions can be traced in virtually all countries even today.
The American Boy Scouts, like many other youth organizations, explicitly
mention patriotism as one of their educational goals.9 Japan just passed a
bill according to which patriotism is a declared goal of the compulsory edu-
cational system and similar developments emerged recently in Poland where
’patriotism’ was discussed as a possible subject to be learned at school.
In what follows I consider eﬀort of this third type: investment in the
9Their oﬃcial aims are stated in their federal charta of June 15, 1916: „...to teach them
patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now
in common use by Boy Scouts.“
5loyalty of citizens and tax payers.10 I leave it open what instruments are used
when pursuing these goals, but assume that the application of these means
is costly. I will ﬁrst allow for countries using both modes of competition:
investments in loyalty of citizens, followed by price competition in terms of
setting tax rates. I will then restrict tax competition by way of a minimum
t a xa n db yt a xh a r m o n i z a t i o n .
The option to use instruments that increase tax payers’ loyalty may ex-
plain why a general downward trend in tax rates has only partially been
observed.11 The low pressure on tax rates may have a partial explanation in
such activities that moderate what would otherwise be a cut-throat compe-
tition.
Loyalty investment, advertising and nation branding has not been the
subject of tax-competition theory, but the analysis of competition for tax
base or mobile capital as a common pool problem has a number of precur-
sors who focused on public expenditure on public goods or infrastructure
as the means of non-price competition. Taylor (1992) considers jurisdictions
which compete for foreign direct investment in a race regarding their speed of
infrastructure investment. Menezes (2003), applying auction theory to this
type of ﬁscal competition considers several variants of auctions, including
an all-pay auction that involves public investment expenditure at multiple
locations and causes wasteful duplication of public infrastructure. Jayet and
Paty (2006) consider a similar problem when jurisdictions decide whether
or not to build up the infrastructure for a business area, hoping to win or
attract lumpy investment. The same type of overinvestment problem is less
10The role of home attachment has received attention in the literature on decentralized
decision making in federations (e.g., Mansoorian and Myers 1993) and in the context of
tax competition (e.g., Andersson and Konrad 2003, Ogura 2006).
11Investors react to taxes. This is well documented by now, starting with early work by
Hartman (1984) and surveyed and evaluated in a meta-study by De Mooij and Ederveen
(2003). However, the literature seemingly fails to come up with unanimous evidence on a
general downward trend of the ﬁscal burden (see, e.g., Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm 2002).
Stewart and Webb 2006, p. 191) draw an even more striking conclusion: "Corporations are
undoubtedly sensitive to taxation, just as homeowners are sensitive to property taxes. Yet
this sensitivity does not give rise to a race to the bottom in corporate taxation any more
than it does to property taxes. The fact that Altshuler and Goodspeed ﬁnd no evidence
of any intensiﬁcation of strategic interaction in capital taxation policies during the post
1980 globalization era is entirely consistent with our results."
6immediately obvious in a framework with smooth capital ﬂo w sa si nK e e n
and Marchand (1997). They also ﬁnd that public expenditure on infrastruc-
ture inputs may be excessive, in particular, compared to their alternative
use for public consumption goods.12 Also Sinn’s (1997) critical assessment of
the functioning of systems competition, particularly the provision of public
infrastructure goods in the context of tax competition hints at this problem.
These approaches essentially consider the problem of attracting desirable
investment as a rent-seeking, or contest problem. Excessive infrastructure
expenditure may occur due to several reasons. First, regions or countries
may invest and sometimes fail to attract investment, due to the lumpiness
of investment projects. Second, even if the allocation of desirable invest-
ment is a smooth function of public infrastructure investment, competition
directs too much resources into infrastructure competition, compared to its
alternative use.
Structurally the analysis uses results from Bertrand competition with
shares of loyal ’customers’, as in Narasimhan (1988) and Deneckere, Kovenock
and Lee (1992), but endogenizes the choice of the set of ’loyal customers’,
with governments competing for tax revenues from their citizens taking the
roles of ﬁrms competing for sales revenues from their customers.13 Ap a p e r
that considers formally the endogeneity of the sets of loyal customers is Roy
(2000). He considers ﬁrms’ decisions to advertise their existence to diﬀerent
sets of potential customers. If a customer knows one ﬁrm only, he buys from
this ﬁrm for any price lower than his reservation price. If the consumer knows
both ﬁrms, this makes him perfectly price sensitive. If he knows none of the
12Several researchers took up this type of competition. Bucovetsky (2005) considers
infrastructure investment in a context with agglomeration. Benassy-Quere, Gobalraja and
Trannoy (2007) allow for both tax competition and public input competition. Wildasin
(1988) and Wilson (2005) consider the role of expenditure competition. Matsumoto (2000)
adds labor mobility and Matsumoto (2004) disaggregates public inputs into inputs that
are complementary to the mobile factor or to the immobile factor of production in this
context. Wehke (2006) analyses how coordination on taxes will aﬀect this second channel
of competition. Feld (1997) considers the role of the political process and the electoral
system for tax rate choices in tax competition.
13In the tax competition context mixed strategy equilibrium has been analysed by An-
dersson and Konrad (2001) and by Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson (2007). The analysis
here is closely related to the literature on Varian’s (1980) "model of sales". See, in partic-
ular, Narasimhan (1988), Deneckere, Kovenock and Lee (1992) and Baye, Kovenock and
de Vries (1992), and Baye and Morgan and Scholten (2007) for an overview.
7ﬁrms, he does not buy at all. Advertising in this framework may generate or
destroy loyalty, depending on whether advertising informs a customer who
already knows another ﬁrm or not. This type of investment in loyalty has its
counterpart in the context of countries’ advertising policy as well. It diﬀers,
however, from the type of investment I will consider, by which countries may
expose their citizens to an activity that may instill a home attachment in a
subgroup of the population.
I proceed as follows. In section 2 I adapt Narasimhan’s analysis of price
competition with loyal customers to the contest of countries’ competition. In
section 3 I consider endogenous choices regarding the policy to instill home
attachment. Sections 4 and 5 consider minimum taxes and harmonized taxes
as possible constraints on the tax rates that countries can choose and how
they aﬀect the countries’ investment in loyalty. Section 6 concludes.
2 Tax competition with loyal tax payers
Consider two countries, A and B. I ne a c hc o u n t r yt h e r ei sas e to fi n i t i a l
residents, described by an interval of length 1. They can be ﬁrms, ﬁrm
owners who may move with their ﬁrms, or individuals with human capital,
and I will refer to them either as "citizens" or "tax payers". The joint set is
the "common pool". In stage 1 the governments i ∈ {A,B} choose how large
a set ni ∈ {0,n} with 0 <n<1 of their initial residents should be made
"loyal", i.e., turned into tax payers with strong home attachment. The cost
of these policies are Ci(0) = 0 and Ci(n)=ci > 0. The set of individuals
of size 2 − nA − nB remains mobile. The governments maximize their tax
revenues, net of investment cost.14 They choose per-head taxes tA and tB
from the interval [0,r] with r a ﬁnite, exogenously given maximum tax. This
choice constitutes stage 2.
In stage 3 individuals react to the taxes. They choose their country
of residence and pay taxes. Loyal citizens are attached to their country.
They simply pay the tax that applies in their country. Non-loyal citizens are
14This objective function is compatible with a Leviathan view of government as well
as with a welfarist government which gives capital owners a low weight in its welfare
function, or has a suﬃciently high shadow price of public funds, for instance, because it
places suﬃcient weight on redistribution.
8perfectly and costlessly mobile and locate in the country with lower taxes. If
both countries have the same tax, they locate in each country with the same





nAtA if tA >t B
(1 +
nA−nB
2 )tA if tA = tB
(2 − nB)tA if tA <t B
(1)
and analogously for B. Note that (1) implicitly deﬁnes a tie-breaking rule:
the tax base 2 − nA − nB that is not home-attached has an equal chance to
locate in each of the countries.15 Taking also into consideration the cost of
ni,t h ep a y o ﬀs can be stated as
πi(n,t)=Ti(n,t) − Ci(ni).( 2 )
The payoﬀs in the taxation subgame are structurally equivalent to the proﬁts
in Narasimhan’s (1988) price leadership game with loyal customers and si-
multaneous choices of prices. Note that this game has no equilibrium in pure
strategies if max{nA,n B} > 0. A proof is by contradiction.16 Narasimhan
shows that this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium for given




2 − nA − nB
−
nBr
(2 − nA − nB)tA




and with FA(tA)=0for tA <
nBr
2−nA and FA(tA)=1for tA ≥ r,a n d
FB(tB)=1+
nA





(2 − nA − nB)tB





with FB(tB)=0for tB <
nBr
2−nA and FB(tB)=1for tB ≥ r.N o t e t h a t
FB dominates FA in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Both
15I make this assumption throughout, in order to avoid optimization problems on open
sets.
16Let nB = n. Suppose (tA,t B) is an equilibrium. Then tB > 0,a stBn>0.L e t
tA = tB > 0.T h e n tA is not an optimal reply to tB. For instance, tA = tB −   for
suﬃciently small positive   yields higher tax revenue for A.L e ttA = tB + δ for a given
ﬁnite positive δ.T h e n tB is not an optimal reply to tA,a stB = tA −   for suﬃciently
small   yields higher tax revenue. Similarly for tB = tA + δ and player A.
9distributions have the same support, but FB(t) ≤ FA(t) for all t ∈ (
nBr
2−nA,r].
Moreover, only FB may possibly have a mass point and this mass point is at
tB = r.
The payoﬀs as functions of the own tax choice that emerge from these
mixed strategies can be obtained by inserting them into the payoﬀ function
(2) as




nBr − CA(nA) (6)
and
πB(tB)=FA(tB)nBtB +( 1− FA(tB))(2 − nA)tB − CB(nB) (7)
= nBr − CB(nB) (8)
for all tA ∈ [
nBr
2−nA,r) and tB ∈ [
nBr
2−nA,r] and smaller than this equilibrium
payoﬀ for tax choices from outside this interval. This shows why these mixed
strategies constitute optimal replies to each other and proves that (3) and (4)
constitute an equilibrium at stage 2. Deneckere, Kovenock and Lee (1992)
provide more intuition on this result. By deﬁnition, country B has more
loyal citizens than country A. The country beneﬁts from having more loyal
citizens if it attracts and taxes only this group. This advantage turns into
a disadvantage in the strategic tax competition game. Each country gains
the same additional tax base 2−nA−nB by undercutting the other country.
Country B has higher cost of undercutting A than vice-versa, as B has the
larger set of loyal citizens who pay B’s tax in any case. Because of this
disadvantage, country B has an equilibrium payoﬀ that is equal to rnB.T h i s
is the minimum amount of taxes which B can obtain, irrespective of tA,a n d
is called the stand-alone payoﬀ of country B. Summarizing, the ﬁnding is
Proposition 1 (Narasimhan 1988) Let nA ≤ nB. Then the tax competition
equilibrium with simultaneous choices of tax rates is characterized by mixed






nBr − CA(nA) and π
∗
B = nBr − CB(nB) (9)
10Note that the country with more loyal tax payers receives an expected
tax revenue that is equal to the revenue from taxing the loyal tax payers
only. If both countries have chosen to invest in loyal tax payers, due to the
symmetry in the size of these groups, both countries end up with tax revenue
Ti = nr.I f c o u n t r y A has chosen nA =0 , then this country also beneﬁts
from the group of patriots in country B. This can be seen from (9) as π∗
A is
increasing in nB.
The equilibrium has interesting comparative static properties. First con-
sider taxation and tax revenue.
Proposition 2 (Baye, Kovenock and de Vries 1992) The country with the
larger group of loyal citizens chooses higher expected taxes.










respectively. However, FA(tA) ≥ FB(tB),i . e . ,FB dominates FA in the sense
of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. By Theorem 1 by Hadar and Russell
(1969) this implies that EtB ≥ EtA.
Countries which have a larger group of loyal citizens may charge higher
taxes in the equilibrium in expectation. For this outcome the particular
reason for citizens’ loyalty does not need to be speciﬁed. Patriotism and
other reasons of emotional attachment to one’s home country serve similarly
as language barriers or institutionally created barriers to migration such as
travel restrictions or closed and strictly guarded borders. A key assumption
for this result is, of course, that the government aims at high tax revenue. But
this is an assumption which is justiﬁed both for countries with policy failure
and a Leviathan government and for welfarist countries in which the tax
proceeds are used to ﬁnance subsistence for a group of (completely immobile
and) very poor citizens, and for which the group of citizens considered here
is the target group for raising revenues for redistributional purposes.
Empirically, one should observe, for instance, that countries with closed
borders, isolated countries, and countries with an overwhelmingly patriotic
population may charge higher taxes. Indeed, as is shown in Kessing and
Konrad (2007), across countries there is a positive and signiﬁcant relationship
between the level of patriotism and the level of income taxation.
11A further comparative static problem relates to the size of the group of
citizens who can be made immobile, for instance, by instilling patriotism or
by other means. Globalization may be seen as a process that either increases
the cost of turning citizens into loyal citizens, or as a process that reduces
the set of people who could be made loyal. The cost eﬀect will be considered
later. The eﬀect that makes the set of potentially loyal citizens smaller is as
follows:
Proposition 3 An increase in n increases the equilibrium tax revenues for
all situations with max{nA,n B} = n.
Proof. Consider the payoﬀs in (9) for the case with nA = nB = n.I nt h i s
case ET∗
A = ET∗
B = nr, and this is increasing in n.F o rnA =0and nB = n,
we have ET∗
A = 2−n


















Firms build up brands, make customers acquainted to these brands by means
of advertising and other marketing means, including the attempt to build up
customer relationships with the inﬂux of new customers. Nations seemingly
pursue similar strategies. They advertise the characteristics of their countries
in newspapers, use other channels for building up relationships with investors
or with citizens with much human capital, and may use their inﬂuence on
primary and secondary education to instill home attachment. This shows
that loyalty ni as deﬁned in section 2 is endogenous.
Roy (2000) considered marketing investment by which ﬁrms can invest
resources to make ﬁrms’ product price known to subsets of a given set of
customers. "Being known" in his context means that these customers will
hear about this ﬁrm’s product price, once this is chosen later on. This type
12of competition may also apply for tax competition. However, I will focus
here on marketing and advertising that is used to build up brand value and
reputation towards their own citizens and capital owners and make their own
citizens "loyal". I restrict this choice of ni to ni ∈ {0,n}.Ac o u n t r ye i t h e r
invests in loyal citizens, or it does not.
Consider the payoﬀs from the diﬀerent combinations of actions as in the
matrix below.






πB = nr − cB
nA = n
πA = nr − cA
πB = 2−n
2 nr
πA = nr − cA
πB = nr − cB
It leads to the following properties of optimal investment in stage 1:
Proposition 4 If ci ∈ [0, n
2nr) then it is optimal for country i to invest in
loyalty. If ci >n r ,t h e ni d o e sn o ti n v e s ti nt h el o y a l t yo fi t sc i t i z e n s . I f
ci ∈ [n
2nr,nr] then it is optimal for country i to invest (not invest) in loyalty
if the other country does not invest (invests) in loyalty.
Proof. Consider country i.L e tqj be the probability that the other country
j invests. Then the payoﬀ of country i is equal to (1 − qj) · 0+qj(2−n
2 nr) if
i does not invest, and equal to (1−qj)(nr −ci)+qj(nr −ci)=( nr −ci) if i
invests. Country i invests if nr − ci >q j(2−n




qj ≥ 0, this shows that ni ≡ 0 for ci >n r .A l s o , i f ci < 1
2n2r,a sqj ≥ 0,t h i s
implies that ni ≡ n for ci < 1






qA =0and qB =1and qA =1and qB =0are optimal replies to each other.
But also qA =2
nr−cB
(2−n)nr and qB =2
nr−cA
(2−n)nr are optimal replies to each other
for this range of costs, as qA =2
nr−cB
(2−n)nr makes B indiﬀerent whether to invest
or not, and qB =2
nr−cA
(2−n)nr makes B indiﬀerent about whether to invest or
not.
The characterization of optimal replies can be used to describe the invest-
ment equilibria for diﬀerent ranges of investment cost as in the nine areas
in Figure 1. At very low and very high values of cA and cB both countries












0 = A n
0 = B n
A nn =
0 B n =
0 = A n
= B nn
= A nn
0 = B n



























0 = B n
Figure 1: Equilibrium investment in loyal tax payers for diﬀerent combina-
tions of cA and cB.
Northeast, Southeast, Southwest) in the matrix in Figure 1. For instance, if
both countries have a very small cost of loyalty investment, they both invest,
such that nA = nB = n. If only one of the countries has a dominant strategy,
this strategy choice induces a choice for the other country. The respective
areas are in the South, North, East and West of Figure 1. If both countries
have an investment cost in the intermediate range ci ∈ [n
2nr,nr],t h e nb o t h
(qA =0 ;qB =1 )and (qA =1 ;qB =0 )are mutually optimal replies. How-





(2−n)nr in this case. These combinations occur in the center of
the matrix in Figure 1. For this mixed strategy equilibrium the values of qA
and qB are both increasing in n. If the technology of making citizens loyal
becomes more eﬀective in terms of the same amount of cost making a larger
s h a r eo ft h eo w np o p u l a t i o nl o y a l ,t h e ns u c ha ni n v e s t m e n tb e c o m e sm o r e






n2r − 2nci +2 ci
n2 (2 − n)
2 r
> 0.
Both the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive for n ∈ (0,1)
for ci ∈ (n
2nr,nr). In order to counterbalance the increased incentive to
invest and to make a country B just indiﬀerent between investing and not
investing, it is required that A increases its probability of also investing
in loyal customers, because this reduces the expected beneﬁtf o rB from
investing.17
Intuitively, investment in citizen loyalty is costly, and its beneﬁcial eﬀect
for tax revenues depends on the investment choice of the other country. If
both countries do not invest in citizen loyalty, then the tax competition that
emerges is very strong and the tax revenue that remains in the equilibrium
is zero. Hence, if one country does not invest, the beneﬁt of investing in
citizen loyalty is high for the other country, and even the country that does
not invest beneﬁts from this investment: the investment makes the countries
asymmetric and causes a strategic disadvantage for the country that invested
in stage 1. There is a wide range of parameters in which a country would
like to free ride on the loyalty investment made by the other country, and
this yields the mixed strategy equilibrium as regards investment in loyalty in
stage 1 in which both countries are just indiﬀerent between investing or not,
because the respective other country invests with a probability that generates
this indiﬀerence. If the cost of investment becomes very small, then both
countries may prefer to invest. The tax equilibrium in stage 2 is always in
mixed strategies. The country that invested in citizen loyalty has a higher
expected tax revenue in the equilibrium, and if this diﬀerence outweighs the
investment cost, both countries prefer the outcome in which they invest in
stage 1. In this outcome both countries compete for the mobile tax base in
a mixed strategy equilibrium in stage 2, but they receive an expected tax
revenue that is equal to the stand-alone tax revenue nr. Finally, if the cost
17Note further that the equilibrium probability of investing in citizen loyalty is also
decreasing in the cost of such investment for the respective other country. However, this
eﬀect is an artefact of the nature of the mixed strategy equilibrium in which the investment
probability must be chosen to generate indiﬀerence.
15of making citizens loyal in stage 1 is higher than what can be gained in terms
of tax revenue in stage 2, then both countries abstain from such activities.
The characterization of equilibria also reveals that loyalty investment be-
comes generally more useful if the set of citizens who can be made loyal by
this investment is larger. If some new technology or means of non-price com-
petition aﬀects the size of n positively, this increases the probability for such
investment to take place, and also increases the expected tax revenue in the
equilibrium. Globalization may aﬀect size of n negatively. This will reduce
the probabilities of investment in the mixed strategy equilibrium, and also
reduces the range in which investing is a dominant strategy for countries.
The cost of rent-seeking eﬀort is equal to cA + cB in the equilibrium












t h ec o s to fe ﬀo r ti ss i m p l ycA or cB, depending on which of the two equilibria
is chosen, and in the mixed strategy equilibrium for this parameter range the
expected cost of such eﬀort is
qAcA + qBcB =
2
(2 − n)




This expected eﬀort is increasing in n and in r. This suggests that globaliza-
tion, interpreted as a decrease in the eﬀectiveness of investment in loyalty,
will generally reduce the eﬀort which is invested in such activities. If such ef-
forts are seen as eﬀorts for attracting a larger share in a global common, then
this aspect is a beneﬁcial aspect of globalization. However, as a consequence
of this reduction in rent-seeking, the tax revenue in the tax competition stage
will also fall in expectation, in line with the standard view on globalization
and tax competition.
4A m i n i m u m t a x
Suppose now that countries cannot choose taxes ti <t min for some exoge-
nous tmin.18 If countries anticipate that the tax competition in stage 2 is
constrained from below by a minimum tax, this will change the tax com-
petition outcome and also has implications for the choice of the countries’
18For a survey also on the role of minimum taxes and tax harmonization see Fuest,
Huber and Mintz (2005), and Peralta and van Ypersele (2006) for a recent contribution.
16rent-seeking eﬀorts in their investment in loyalty. Proposition 5 considers
cases of suﬃciently large minimum taxes.
Proposition 5 Let nB = nA =0 .A n y m i n i m u m t a x tmin > 0 yields an
equilibrium with tA = tB = tmin.L e t nA = nB = n.A m i n i m u m t a x w i t h
tmin ∈ [nr,r] yields an equilibrium in pure strategies with tA = tB = tmin.
Let min{nA,n B} =0and max{nA,n B} = n.T h e n a m i n i m u m t a x w i t h
tmin ∈ [ 2rn
n+2,r] yields an equilibrium with tA = tB = tmin.
Proof. Consider nA = nB =0 .L e tA choose tA = tmin > 0. For all tB >t A,
B will not attract any tax base, and the corresponding tax revenue is zero.
Accordingly, the optimal reply to tA = tmin is tB(tmin)=tmin,a st h i sy i e l d s
at a xr e v e n u ee q u a lt otmin · 2
2 = tmin > 0 for tmin > 0.
Consider next nA = nB = n.L e t A choose tA = tmin ≥ nr.F o r a l l
tB >t A the country B receives tax revenue tBn, which is maximal for tB = r.
Accordingly, the optimal reply to tA = tmin is either tB = tmin with tax
revenue equal to tmin[n+ 2−2n
2 ] or tB = r with tax revenue equal to rn.A st h e
tax revenue tmin·1 ≥ nr, the optimal reply is tB(tmin)=tmin. For symmetry,
the same condition applies for tA to be an optimal reply to tB = tmin.
Consider ﬁnally nA =0and nB = n.C o u n t r y B’s optimal reply to
tA = tmin ∈ [ 2rn
n+2,r] is either tB = r, yielding tax revenue equal to rn,o r
tB = tmin, which yields tax revenue equal to tmin(n + 2−n
2 ).F o r tmin to be
optimal requires tmin(n+ 2−n
2 ) ≥ rn,w h i c hi se q u i v a l e n tw i t htmin ≥ 2rn
n+2.I n
turn, country A ’s optimal reply to tB = tmin is either tmin , which yields tax
revenue tmin[2−n
2 ],o rtA = r which yields tax revenue of zero. Accordingly,
for A t h ec h o i c eo ftA = tmin > 0 dominates any tA >t B due to nA =0 .( T h e
same argument holds if the roles of A and B are reversed.)
Proposition 5 characterizes a minimum tax that is so high that the tax
revenue that each country has if both charge the minimum tax is higher than
what a country can obtain from deviating and choosing any other tax rate
higher than this minimum tax. Such a deviation will leave this country with
at a xr e v e n u etini, as the other country receives the tax revenue from its loyal
citizens, plus the tax revenue from all mobile citizens. This tax revenue from
deviating is therefore maximal if the country i chooses the highest possible
tax rate, r. The conditions regarding the minimum tax that are stated in
Proposition 5 make this tax revenue (weakly) smaller than the tax revenue
if the countries both charge the minimum tax.
17Note that the imposition of a minimum tax may cause the countries to
choose a tax that is lower than the tax they might have chosen otherwise,
and the imposition of a minimum tax may cause the expected tax that is
charged to reduce. To see this, consider the case with nA = nB = n.I nt h i s














with F0(t) calculated from (3) for nA = nB = n.T h i s a v e r a g e t a x r a t e
without a minimum tax is higher than the equilibrium tax with a minimum








)) − nr > 0,( 1 1 )
which is equivalent with 2−n
n > exp(2 − 2n) and holds for n ∈ (0,1).T h e
coordinated minimum tax (and even a high one) can drive down the average
tax rate. Note that this does not imply that the minimum tax also drives
down the average tax revenue, as the mobile tax base always moves to the
low-tax country. Hence, the average tax burden on tax base is lower in the
equilibrium with the unconstrained tax rate than the average tax rate.
Turning next to the implications of a suﬃciently high minimum tax for
the choices of nA and nB, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6 If the minimum tax is tmin ≥ nr then a subgame perfect









Proof. Both countries anticipate that tA = tB = tmin. Accordingly, the
payoﬀ of country A is tmin
2−nB
2 if nA =0 , and equal to tmin
2−nA−nB
2 +tminnA−
cA if nA = n, and similarly for B. The optimality of ni as characterized in
the proposition follows from comparing these payoﬀs.
Note that nr ≥ 2rn
n+2.T h em i n i m u mt a xtmin ≥ nr is, therefore, suﬃciently
high such that the equilibrium tax is tmin for all combinations of loyalty
investment in stage 1. Indeed, as this is not true for the tmin ∈ [ 2rn
n+2,nr] this
parameter range is more cumbersome and not treated formally here.
18Intuitively, if the minimum tax rate is suﬃciently high, both countries
choose a tax rate equal to this minimum tax rate in the stage-2 equilibrium.
As they can charge this tax rate on all their loyal citizens, but have to
share the mobile citizens with the other country, the investment in loyalty
of a set of n citizens is worthwhile if the cost of this investment is lower
than the additional tax revenue that res u l t sf r o mt h i si n v e s t m e n t ,w h i c hi s
equal to tminn/2.A s u ﬃciently high minimum tax turns the problem in a
pure common pool problem: the common pool is shared equally between the
competitors, unless they expend eﬀort trying to appropriate a larger share
of the common pool for themselves. This is what is accomplished by the
investment in loyalty.
Cases with a lower minimum tax rate yield a more colorful picture. The
way the taxation equilibrium is aﬀected by the minimum tax depends on the
choices (nA,n B). Three cases need to be distinguished.
Case 1: nA = nB =0 . In this case any positive minimum tax leads to
a tax equilibrium with tA = tB = tmin ≤ rn and tax revenues TA(tmin)=
TB(tmin)=tmin.
Case 2: nA = nB = n.I f tmin ≤ nr/(2 − n), then the equilibrium
tax strategies as in Section 2 are still feasible and mutually optimal replies.
Hence, the tax equilibrium is unaﬀected. If tmin ∈ ( nr
2−n,rn), then the equi-
librium is in mixed strategies, with the cdfs of tax rates that are charac-
terized by Figure 2 being optimal replies to each other. This mutual op-
timality can be checked as follows. First we observe that, given FB as
in Figure 2, the expected tax revenue of country A is equal to nr for all
tA ∈ {tmin}∪[t0,r] by inserting in the payoﬀ functions, taking into consider-
ation that t0 =
nrtmin
ntmin−2tmin+2nr.
Intuitively, A’s payoﬀ along the interval tA ∈ (t0,r) is the same as in the
absence of a minimum tax. However, once the tax rate which A may choose
drops further and comes suﬃciently close to the minimum tax, the minimum
tax becomes more attractive than this tax: unlike without this minimum
tax, A cannot be undercut at the minimum tax. Both players have a mass
point at the minimum tax. In turn, this implies that, if they both choose the
minimum tax, they have to share the mobile tax base equally. If A increases
tA just slightly above tmin, this increases A’s tax revenue on nA = n,b u tA
loses the tax revenue on 2−2n
2 FB(tmin) as all the mobile tax base stays with B
with probability FB(tmin). Hence, small increases in tA compared to tA = tmin
19are inferior. Only if A chooses a suﬃciently high tax rate, the gain on the
loyal tax payers compensates for this expected loss in the mobile tax base.
The tax rate t0 and the mass point it generates at tmin just balance in the
sense that the payoﬀ from choosing t0 (or any other tA ∈ (t0,r))i se q u a lt o
the payoﬀ from choosing tmin.
By symmetry, the same reasoning applies for B. Third, note that any
feasible choices of tA or tB from (tmin,t 0) outside the equilibriums support,







Figure 2: The equilibrium cdfs for nA = nB = n and tmin ∈ ( nr
2−n,rn) for
numerical values n = .5, r =1and tmin = .4.
The expected tax revenue of each country in this equilibrium is TA =









(2 − n)tmin − nr
(1 − n)tmin
.
Case 3: nA =0 , nB = n. (Note that there is also an analogous Case
4 which is obtained from Case 3 by A and B changing roles). If tmin ≤






Figure 3: The equilibrium cdfs for nA =0 , nB = n and tmin ∈ (nr
2 , 2rn
n+2) for
numerical values n = .5, r =1and tmin = .4.
nr/2, then the equilibrium tax strategies as in Section 2 are still feasible and
mutually optimal replies. Hence, the tax equilibrium is unaﬀected. If tmin ∈
(nr
2 , 2rn
n+2), then the equilibrium is in mixed strategies in tax rate choices,
with the cdfs that are characterized in Figure 3, with t0 =
nrtmin
2(nr−tmin). These
cdfs coincide with the equilibrium mixed strategies in the case without a
minimum tax in the range ti ∈ (t0,r). However, both players have a mass
point at the minimum tax and do not choose taxes in the range (tmin,t 0).
The mutual optimality of these strategies can be conﬁrmed as follows: ﬁrst,
it can be veriﬁed by inserting into the equation that determines A’s expected
tax revenue for given FB(t), that the expected tax revenue for country A is
equal to nr
2 (2 − n) for any choice tA ∈ {tmin} ∪ [t0,r], and strictly lower for
any feasible tA from outside this set. Second, it can be veriﬁed by inserting
into the equation that determines B’s expected tax revenue for given FA(t),
that the expected tax revenue for B is equal to nr for any choice tB ∈
{tmin} ∪ [t0,r], and strictly lower for any feasible tB from outside this set.
The mixed strategy equilibrium that emerges for the intermediate range of
minimum taxes is structurally similar to the mixed strategy equilibrium that
21emerges in all-pay auctions if players face an upper limit on their individual
bidding eﬀorts. The latter problem has been studied by Che and Gale (1998).
This equilibrium is generically unique, but for some particular combinations
of parameters further equilibria can emerge.
Consider now the choice of investment in citizens’ loyalty in stage 1.
Recall that 2rn
n+2 ≤ nr. Accordingly, for the range tmin < 2rn
n+2 the following
equilibrium payoﬀs emerge from the diﬀerent investment choices according
to the three cases that have been outlined:






πB = nr − cB
nA = n
πA = nr − cA
πB = 2−n
2 nr
πA = nr − cA
πB = nr − cB
(12)
The equilibrium choices of investment can be inferred from this matrix along
similar lines as in the case without a minimum tax. The optimal investment






2 nr +( 1− qj)tmin >n r− ci
n if qj
2−n
2 nr +( 1− qj)tmin <n r− ci
(13)
and any qi ∈ [0,1] is optimal if qj
2−n
2 nr +( 1− qj)tmin = nr − ci. This leads
to the following
Proposition 7 (i) The introduction of a minimum tax tmin < 2rn
n+2 increases
the range of investment cost for which ni =0is a dominant strategy. (ii)
The minimum tax decreases the range of a country’s cost in which ni = n
is a dominant strategy. (iii) The minimum tax does not aﬀect country i’s
equilibrium payoﬀ if qi > 0 in the equilibrium.
Proof. (i): By (13) the choice ni =0is a dominant strategy for i if ci >
nr − qj
2−n
2 nr +( 1− qj)tmin for all qj ∈ [0,1]. The right-hand side of this
inequality is strictly increasing in tmin for any given qj < 1 and constant in
tmin for qj =1 . (ii): By (13) the choice ni =1is a dominant strategy for
i if ci <n r− qj
2−n
2 nr +( 1− qj)tmin for all qj ∈ [0,1]. The right-hand side
of this inequality is strictly increasing for all qj < 1 and constant in tmin for
22qj =1 . (iii) If qi > 0,t h e nni = n is an optimal investment choice and leads
t oap a y o ﬀ equal to nr − ci, which is independent of tmin.
A minimum tax increases the payoﬀs of the two countries in case they
both do not invest, but does not aﬀect the payoﬀsi fa tl e a s to n eo ft h e
countries invests. The immediate eﬀect of this is that investment in loyalty
of citizens becomes less rewarding. A low minimum tax may therefore have
no impact on the actual tax competition in case at least one country invested
in loyal citizens, but it may reduce the incentives to invest in loyalty. For
some range of parameters, a small coordinated minimum tax can therefore
reduce the eﬀorts that countries expend in establishing property rights in
their citizens or tax payers.
5A h a r m o n i z e d t a x
Tax harmonization is among the proposals considered by policy makers in
the context of tax competition. Some degree of harmonization has been
reached, for instance, within the European Union, with respect to import
duties. Harmonization is also discussed frequently in the context of corporate
taxation. For instance, the Ruding committee (CEC 1992) has made explicit
recommendations in this respect. The beneﬁts and costs of tax harmonization
have also stimulated considerable interest in the academic literature on tax
competition. It has been noticed that harmonization of taxes is often partial
in the sense that, while it blocks tax competition with respect to some tax
instruments, there remains a suﬃcient number of other instruments that
allow for tax competition to continue.19 The analysis here follows a similar
line of argument. Tax harmonization will not remove or block the non-price
competition instruments available to countries.
The case with perfect tax harmonization turns the competition problem
between countries into a pure common-pool problem. The countries will try
to acquire a high share in the tax base and then tax it according to the rate
they have agreed upon.
19See, e.g., Fuest (1995), Fuest and Huber (1999), Marchand, Pestieau and Sato (2003),
and Wehke (2006).
23Consider non-price competition, assuming that the tax rate that is chosen
by both countries is uniform and equal to th.T h e f o l l o w i n g p r o p o s i t i o n
describes the equilibrium in stage 1.
Proposition 8 If 1
2thn ≥ max{cA,c B} then both countries invest in home
attachment of their citizens. If min{cA,c B} < 1
2thn<max{cA,c B} then only
the country with the smaller cost invests. If min{cA,c B} > 1
2thn then none
of the countries invests in the home attachment of their citizens.
Proof. For a proof, note that the payoﬀsf r o md i ﬀerent investment strategies
a r ea si nt h ef o l l o w i n gp a y o ﬀ matrix:







2nth + th − cB
nA = n
πA = 1
2nth + th − cA
πB = 2−n
2 th
πA = th − cA
πB = th − cB
(14)
Let cA ≥ cB. Then the equilibrium is in pure strategies with nA = nB = n
if cB ≤ cA ≤ 1
2thn, as this implies that both players prefer to invest, regardless
whether the other player invested or not. Second, if cB < 1
2thn<c A,t h e n
an equilibrium exists in which only B invests and A prefers not to invest.
This can also be seen from the matrix in (14): B prefers to invest, as the
additional proﬁt from investing is 1
2thn − cB > 0, independent of whether A
invests or not, and for A the cost of investing exceeds the beneﬁts in terms of
additional tax returns, independent of whether B invests or not. Hence, this
asymmetric equilibrium is an equilibrium in dominant strategies. Finally, if
cA ≥ cB > 1
2thn, then both players prefer not to invest, independent of the
other player’s investment decision.
Overall, Proposition 8 shows that there are threshold levels for the har-
monized tax rate. If the harmonized tax rate is very low, this low level
of the tax removes the incentives to generate home-attachment. If the tax
rate is above some level, at least one of the countries starts to invest, and if
the tax rate is suﬃciently high, both countries prefer investment compared
to the option not to invest. This structure is equivalent to a most simple
version of a rent-seeking contest. It is, however, a rent-seeking contest in
24which investment eﬀort can take only a discrete number of levels, and the
contest is initiated only if what can be gained from expending contest eﬀort
is suﬃciently much. The outcome with both countries investing in home
attachment of their citizens constitutes a prisoners’ dilemma. Both players
expend wasteful eﬀort to deﬁne "property rights" in part of this tax base,
i.e., to protect part of their home tax base from possibly ﬂoating out of the
country.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In a globalized economy with vanishing physical cost of crossing borders for
human capital, ﬁnancial capital and direct investment, the stock of mobile
capital can be seen as a global common: all countries would like to graze on
this common: they would like to attract a large share of this capital and
levy taxes on it or its returns. Unfortunately capital is a shy species, and
has a tendency to ﬂee from high-tax countries to low-tax countries. This
relationship has studied intensively in the context of the tax competition
literature.
The common resource property aspect of the global tax base becomes
visible from observing that competition for capital is not only ﬁscal com-
petition. Countries use other activities to generate a favorable bias that
relaxes Bertrand competition. The activities include informative or persua-
sive advertising, political persuasion and inﬂuence, and eﬀo r tt h a ti n c r e a s e s
the value of the brand name of a country and enables policies that make in-
vestors or citizens loyal to this brand. These include educational eﬀort that
generates home attachment or even patriotism among the own population.
This rent-seeking competition closely resembles the competition for a com-
mon pool resource in which players expend eﬀo r tt r y i n gt oa c q u i r ep r o p e r t y
rights in, or a share of, a common pool resource.
Bertrand competition in tax rates interacts with the appropriation con-
ﬂict in which countries ﬁght about property rights in the tax base. In the
formal part of the paper I assumed that countries can generate loyalty of
some group of capital owners by expending appropriate eﬀort. I then con-
sidered the outcome of tax competition in a framework in which some or all
countries induced loyalty among a subgroup of their citizens. Based on this
25tax competition outcome I analyze the incentives for such loyalty investment.
Countries with low cost of such investment have a higher incentive to invest
in the loyalty of their own citizens, but higher loyalty among own citizens is
a strategic disadvantage in the tax competition game.
I also consider tax harmonization and tax coordination (a minimum tax)
and show that such measures have a tendency to reduce the incentives to
engage in appropriation eﬀort.
The welfare implications of this analysis are diﬃcult, given that home
attachment often goes along with a change in the preferences of citizens. As
far as home attachment is simply a means to increase the mobility cost to
a prohibitively high level, the investment in such citizen loyalty is wasteful
from a global point of view. However, in a second-best world such invest-
ment may be beneﬁcial as it allows countries to collect higher tax returns
from their citizens in the Bertrand equilibrium. Where the erosion of tax
revenue endangers the welfare state, these activities can be seen as second-
best reactions of the nation states by which they address the problem of
eroding tax revenues.
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